"He is a little man, about five feet two inches in height, in a badly cut gray striped suit, with trousers a couple of inches too short. He has a pronounced facial tic and his right shoulder twitches constantly. When he walks, he throws his right leg a little sideways as if he has no control over it. He was obviously excited and ill at ease, and uncertain of what to do with his arms and hands."
--journalist Mark Gayn describing Emperor Hirohito
on one of his postwar goodwill tours, March 26th, 1946
The American
novelist, William Faulkner, famously said, “The past is never dead.
It's not even past.” His subject matter was black-white race
relations and the legacy of slavery in the American South, but his
words serve the Japanese experiment in twentieth century imperialism,
the scars of its militarism yet unhealed, and the descendants of the
rulers and the oppressed nursing respective grievances. World War II ended
nearly seventy years ago, the blood spilled long since washed away, but a
new nationalism in East Asia is drawing up a stale and divisive
rhetoric, taking arrogant postures, and pretending history is
malleable and can be recast according to one's manufactured political
persuasions.
The American
historian, Herbert Bix's biography of Japan's most notorious emperor,
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (Harper Collins,
2000), is an 800-page tome indicting Hirohito in no uncertain terms
for the war crimes for which he was never prosecuted. Like an attorney
who will leave no doubt in the reader's mind, Bix carefully assembles
a narrative, beginning with Hirohito's grandfather, Meiji, and how
his constitution allocated tremendous authority to the Chrysanthemum
Throne. Nearly a hundred pages of the book are citations of evidence
reflecting Japanese militarism and a racist philosophy propagated by
Japanese intellectuals and historians that led to the colonization of
Manchuria, sexual bondage in the Korean peninsula, and an irrational
war of conquest that nearly caused Japan's total obliteration. Every
step of the way, Hirohito authorized or failed to punish the
inhumane crimes of his military establishment. Moreover, Bix argues
it was Hirohito's self-centered maneuvers to preserve his throne and
avoid just punishment that prolonged the war unnecessarily long after
Japan's cause was lost, and that the deaths of hundreds of thousands
of Japanese civilians is the emperor's burden, as much as it is that
of the Americans who authorized the atomic apocalypses.
Modern Japanese
militarism has its origins when policy leaders began debating the
kokutai, an archaic rarely-used concept nowadays. Kokutai
are the best possible principles of Japanese state and society.
Alas, it was inevitable that conservative ideologues would win the
interpretation to ensure a status quo of the nearly feudal hierarchy
that defined the structure of Japanese society for most of its
history. Kokutai was then coupled with kodo, the
“imperial way,” a political theology that declared the divine
right of the emperor, who embodied moral goodness. The court, the
military, and conservative political operatives could then utilize
their reactionary agenda via imperial decree, as the emperor could
make palatable even the most ruthless policies.
Hirohito was an
amateur marine biologist. Small in
stature, shy, and awkward, he was not a strongman. His
personality was easily overshadowed by his arrogant generals and
court advisers. Nevertheless, he was intelligent, detail-oriented and
had been inculcated by court tutors to take divine right seriously,
and that it was his responsibility to take part in political affairs,
legitimizing Japanese militarism to the poor farmer sons who would
have to leave their homeland and their families for dubious acts of
violence in China, Korea, and Taiwan in service of the Emperor.
Because of WWII's total destruction, it's easy to overlook the trauma of the first world war. After Versailles, the US and
Britain, via the League of Nations, put together a number of
international treaties outlawing wars of aggression, most famously
the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928. Japanese leaders interpreted that as
an Anglo-American initiative to consolidate their vast colonial
holdings (a fair argument-- they also called Europe on its hypocrisy,
declaring peace overtures while resorting to violence to keep its
multitudes in Africa and Asia in line). The Japanese imperialist
philosophy, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, wanted to rid
Asia of European colonialists (as well as their pernicious cultural
influence). The war in Asia-- beginning in China, and spreading to
Britain's and France's holdings in Southeast Asia, as well as the United
States' colony in the Philippines-- was justified as Asia for Asians, though the new hierarchy
would indubitably place Japan at the top.
Every step of the
way, Hirohito rubber-stamped his generals' advances. As emperor he
could have cautioned or refuted militarism, and initially he
sometimes did feel outrage at aggression, but overwhelmed by other, stronger personalities, he admitted “it can't be helped,” whether
it was the political assassinations, repression of radicals, the
Nanking Massacre, Pearl Harbor, or allied bombing of Japanese civilians, Hirohito
decided to continue an unwinnable war waged with morally dubious
values.
There is no
question that Hirohito had absolute power. There is also no doubt
that by summer of 1944, Japan would lose the war. Their ally, Nazi
Germany, had been invaded at Normandy, and it was certain that the
Soviets would turn their attention to Japan once Berlin fell.
Moreover, after a spectacular blitzkrieg in late 1941, early 1942,
Japan lost every single battle against the United States beginning
with Midway, sustaining heavy casualties (to surrender to the enemy
was seen as an act of ultimate shame-- better to die for the
emperor). The US had closed Japanese sea lanes, in the process removing access to vital natural resources, as they slowly moved the
Pacific war towards the home islands. In
fact, the army and navy were in such dire shape, the only major
losses the Americans were incurring by 1945 were kamikaze attacks and
suicide charges. Thus, thousands of young men were being asked to die
needlessly in the emperor's name. Why did Hirohito permit this? Why
didn't he stop the war after Tokyo was firebombed on the night of
March 9th, 1945 (in which 100,000 civilians were killed)?
Instead they passed out bamboo spears to women, children, and old men
in the event of an amphibious American invasion. They sent thousands
of balloons charged with explosive across the Pacific (almost none of them
reaching the U.S. and none detonating over population centers) Meanwhile, dozens of Japanese urban industrialized
areas would be bombed in the five months between Tokyo's firestorming and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why did Hirohito persist, causing so much
unnecessary death?
Self-preservation,
of course. The Americans wanted unconditional surrender, like they'd
had with Germany. The atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration of war
(happening the same week, a very bad one for Japan) spelled the
futility in no uncertain terms. On August 15th, 1945, Hirohito gave his famous radio
address announcing Japan's surrender. But the emperor needn't have
worried. Though he had to give up his divinity status, US leadership (under the guidance of General Douglas MacArthur) was
more concerned with total destabilization brought on by his
abdication (they were quite concerned about communism and radicalism). During the Tokyo
Trials, Hirohito was not brought up as a war criminal and the
infamous, Hideki Tojo, became the fall guy, the villain, taking the
rap for the emperor (supposedly the emperor wept the morning Tojo was
executed). Hirohito received all the credit for surrendering and none
of the blame for the catastrophe. He kept his throne, collaborated
with the Americans for the reconstruction of Japan, and approved of
the famous peace constitution written by the Americans “forever”
renouncing war. Hirohito would reign for another 44 years, in what
would be one of the greatest economic booms of any society on earth,
creating a middle class, a strong safety net, and progressive values,
where once there had been almost none.
The famous photograph of MacArthur and Hirohito
Bix has presented irrefutable evidence from various court sources and testimony regarding Hirohito's war guilt. American leadership made a calculated choice not to prosecute him for these crimes. Bix's immense and laboriously composed book is not necessarily a judgment on either the emperor nor Truman and MacArthur. It is not saying that Hirohito was a "bad" man. History is too complex for such trite conclusions. But it is conclusive that the emperor was complicit in giving his imperial seal on some of the worst excesses of Japanese war crimes. And moreover, his failure to act decisively in the certainty of defeat inexorably led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians. This is not up for debate or revision. This is what happened. But how to imagine a Japan had Hirohito been tried and punished like his beloved general and prime minister, Tojo, is one of those pathways history turned away from.
So we return to
Faulkner and the presence of the past, our contemporary time and a new nationalism ascendant in Japan's far
right government. The prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is playing a risky
game of brinksmanship with South Korea and especially China,
quarreling territorially over a few rocks near Taiwan and revising
history, absolving Japan of its criminal past. It is terrifying to
consider how clumsy Abe is diplomatically, moreover, how poorly he is
mistaking his agenda as that of a populist's. Japan's far-right is a vocal
community, but they are a distinct minority, and the vast population of Japan
does not seem very politically inclined, and would certainly be
outraged by any sacrifice induced by (yet another unwinnable) war
with China. Perhaps he is thinking his security treaty with the
United States means U.S. armed forces would do his dirty work? I don't think any
US president would commit American boys to China for a few
uninhabitable rocks and Japan's reactionary misguided historical
viewpoint. And certainly, almost no Japanese today will be willing to die
for their emperor. That ideological cult is in the dustbin of history. He is no longer a god, he is just a man, a flawed
one, like all of us.